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ABSTRACT 
Since 2003, the Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) community has changed initial training 
on two occasions.  In 2003, they replaced schoolhouse training (SWOS) with an OJT 
intensive shipboard computer-based-training in response to criticism that SWOS was a 
wasteful use of six months.  Yet, SWOs considered “SWOS-at-Sea” inadequate fleet 
preparation, prompting the reestablishment of one month of “SWO Intro.”  A 2010 
Government Accountability Office report concluded the Navy must evaluate how 
changes to training impact job performance, not just budgetary costs.  Analysis of SWO 
training costs should consider how training changes impact officer proficiencies and 
qualification time.  This thesis calculates the SWO OJT investment assuming the Navy 
subsidizes officer development until officers achieve SWO qualification.  The research 
proposes first-tour officer proficiency is a function of commissioning source and initial 
training professional development.  After arrival at the ship, proficiency is measured by 
SWO Personnel Qualification Standards (PQS) progress and, ultimately, SWO 
qualification.  The analysis finds that decreases to initial training increase shipboard 
training costs, and that changes to initial training have not been accommodated by 
appropriate shifts in qualification time requirements.  Recommendations include adopting 
SWOS’s proposal for two months of initial training in San Diego and Norfolk, ensuring 
SWOS learning outcomes are based on SWO PQS, and adjusting SWO qualification time 
requirements to reflect level of initial training. 
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1. The Road to Surface Warfare Officer Division Officer Course 
Prior to the advent of the Naval Aviation and Nuclear Power communities, the 
Navy’s only path to command at sea was through service on surface combatant ships.  
Malcolm Muir wrote in Black Shoes and Black Water,  
World War II represented the great divide for the surface navy.  Until that 
conflict, the lion’s share of the U.S. Navy’s budget went to the battleships, 
cruisers, and destroyers whose top officers made up the so-called Gun 
Club.  These black-shoe officers dominated the Navy’s principal decision-
making body, the General Board, and such significant bureaus as the 
Bureau of Ships and the Bureau of Ordnance.  But during the Pacific War, 
naval aviation seized the reins.  The aircraft carrier with its longer reach 
supplanted the battleship as the arbiter of fleet actions; the aviators moved 
into dominant positions within the Navy’s command structure. (Muir, 
1996) 
According to Muir, once the aviation and submarine communities proved their value to 
the nation, Navy budgets quickly accommodated them, naturally at the expense of the 
surface warfare community.  Various U.S. Naval Institute: Proceedings articles indicated 
that the submarine and aviation communities offered better promotion opportunities, and 
generally attracted competitive individuals to their ranks (Robinson, 2008).  One 
particular article written by Commander Rahill in 1952 championed destroyer duty as a 
means of preparation for duty in the aviation and submarine communities, a stepping 
stone of sorts (Rahill, 1952).  
During this same time, the Navy’s historically surface warfare centric education 
system began to change.  The United States Naval Academy offered the only path to a 
commission in the U.S. Navy prior to 1926, and was the Navy’s sole training school for 
unrestricted line officers (basically SWOs).  But as midshipmen’s service selection 
options grew, so did the Academy’s training curriculum.  What was once a technical 
school that trained officers for service on ships now had to accommodate the emerging 
communities’ accession needs as well.  SWO training for midshipmen became further 
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marginalized when the Naval Academy transitioned from a trade school to a hard science 
and liberal arts institution (Muir, 1996).  Additionally, in 1926 Naval Reserve Officer 
Training Corps (NROTC) was developed to offer an alternate path to receive a 
commission in the Navy.  The combined effect of less surface warfare training from the 
Naval Academy and the introduction of new commissioning programs offered by civilian 
institutions provided the need to establish a technical school for Surface Warfare 
Officers. 
The Surface Warfare community struggled to recruit and retain officers post-
WWII.  The nuclear and aviation communities were increasingly attractive to newly 
commissioned officers who could anticipate higher pay, superior technical training, and a 
faster promotion rate.  In 1949, a submariner wrote in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 
“the idea that the only roads to success are submarines and aviation is bad for the Navy” 
(Muir, 1996).  This officer’s point is further exemplified by the aviation community’s 
near monopoly on the attainment of Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) position from 
1961 to 1982.  The only SWO to become CNO during that period was Admiral Elmo 
Zumwalt Jr.  Given that the SWOs had little opportunity to influence the Navy from its 
highest post in recent years, Admiral Zumwalt took full advantage as CNO to overhaul 
his community’s image. 
In 1970, Zumwalt commissioned a SWO Retention Study Group to analyze the 
factors contributing to his community’s retention problems.  Among the myriad of 
recommendations were calls for “better schooling, and a surface warfare pin equivalent to 
the dolphins worn by submariners or the wings by the aviators” (Robinson, 2008).  
Within the year, the Navy established a Surface Warfare designation in the personnel 
system, made qualifications for the community more selective, prohibited dropouts from 
Nuclear Power School and Flight School from joining the Surface Warfare Community, 
and established what would later be called the Surface Warfare Officer Division Officer 
Course (SWOSDOC) (Robinson, 2008). 
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2. SWO Basic and SWOSDOC 
By establishing SWO Basic in 1970, the Navy provided all SWOs with baseline 
training prior to their arrival to the fleet for the first time.  In order to have a properly 
functioning training command, the surface community first needed to establish training 
objectives that met the needs of the fleet.  During this same period, Admiral Zumwalt 
oversaw the merger of all surface type commands into just two, one for each coast.  By 
consolidating a dispersed group of surface combatants into one administrative command, 
the surface community could more effectively establish requirements to which all SWO 
training would adhere.  These Personnel Qualification Standards (PQS) formed the basis 
for the SWO Basic curriculum. 
Upon reporting to SWO Basic, officers were provided PQS booklets which were 
to be completed to the extent possible during training.  SWO Basic was designed to teach 
SWOs the “fundamentals” and “systems” sections of PQS, leaving the “watchstanding” 
section to be completed upon arrival to the fleet.  In 1980, Captain John Parker, Director 
of Surface Warfare Manpower and Training Requirements said,  
It is the application of theory and system knowledge to watch performance 
that is important to the command.  Knowledge of theory and system 
knowledge is important to the SWO candidate, of course, since he will not 
be able to cope with watchstation qualifications without a solid and 
complete understanding of theory and systems, and that’s what we are 
requiring now at SWOS Basic. (Navy, 1980) 
This “train to qualify” method would form the backbone of SWO training. 
In 1986, SWO Basic was renamed Surface Warfare Division Officer Course 
(SWDOC) to avoid the reputation of being overly fundamental.  At the same time, the 
Navy decoupled the PQS from the objectives of the curriculum. (Navy, 2002)  By placing 
a heavier emphasis on watchstanding and decision making, SWDOC went beyond its 
initial charter of providing the fundamentals and systems PQS knowledge.  The following 
year, the USS Stark was hit by an Iraqi Exocet missile, sparking widespread criticism of 
the Navy’s state of readiness, and consequently its training methods.  SWDOC (later 
renamed SWOSDOC) began receiving criticism from the fleet that it was not properly 
preparing its junior officers for service onboard ship.  Some complained that their junior 
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officers were showing up at the fleet without fundamental knowledge of how to do their 
jobs.  In a 1998 Proceedings article, LTJG Poole posited that, “Student aviators fly 
planes, and student submariners operate nuclear plants, but student warriors [SWOs] sit 
in a classroom” (Poole, 1998).   In the following years, the fleet began offering proposals 
on how to correct SWO training.   
3. SWOS-at-Sea 
After over a decade of debate within the surface community, Commander Naval 
Surface Forces (COMNAVSURFOR) VADM Timothy LaFleur ended Newport’s control 
of SWO training in 2002, transferring responsibility to the waterfront via a curriculum of 
shipboard computer-based training (CBT).  He justified the move, stating “This will 
result in higher professional satisfaction, increase the return on investment during the first 
division officer (DIVO) tour, and free up more career time downstream” (Navy, 2002, p. 
32).  In other words, by eliminating six months of formal training, SWOS-at-Sea would 
allow junior officers to attain SWO qualification sooner in their careers, and have more 
time onboard ship to hone skills as mariners and leaders. 
While there was always a certain degree of on-the-job training (OJT) inherent in 
SWO training, SWOS-at-Sea took it to a new level.  Aside from exposure to professional 
topics at their commissioning sources (which varied widely across the fleet), and 
temporary duty en route (TDY) billet specialty training, junior officers were expected to 
learn their entire job aboard ship. 
While some officers excelled in this fast-paced immersion program, there were 
many officers for whom SWOS-at-Sea was poorly designed.  A 2009 Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) study surveyed students attending the Advanced Shiphandling and Tactics 
Course (ASAT) in Newport, RI (Bowman & Crawford, 2009).  Survey responses 
indicated that the SWO CBT method of instruction was ineffective.  A common criticism 
of SWOS-at-Sea was that it placed the responsibility for training junior officers squarely 
on the Commanding Officer’s (CO) shoulders, thus making it highly dependent on 
factors unique to a ship’s command climate, manpower and operational tempo.  When 
asked what they would change in the training to make it more effective, one DIVO 
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responded “It would be good not to feel clueless and useless on day-one on your ship” 
(Bowman & Crawford, p. 37). Other responses indicated that DIVOs rarely had time to 
complete their CBT modules amidst the many requirements such as divisional work, PQS 
qualification, and watchstanding.  One officer indicated that when they found time to 
work on CBT, they were criticized for “hiding in the stateroom” (Bowman & Crawford, 
p. 35).  This particular response demonstrated a significant disconnect between the SWO 
training objectives and actual shipboard culture.  By 2007, it seemed inevitable the 
surface community would have to address the growing criticism that SWOS-at-Sea 
provided too little in the way of initial training, and was too dependent on shipboard 
factors to establish a reliable baseline of SWO knowledge.   
4. SWO Introduction 
In a 2008 interview with the Department of the Navy website Surface Warfare 
Officer’s Network (SWONET), COMNAVSURFOR VADM Derwood Curtis rejected 
the SWOS-at-Sea training model, and spoke of re-establishing formal training in what 
would be called SWO Intro.  Admiral Curtis stated, “Some SWOs were coming to our 
ships not ready to perform” (Robinson, 2008, p. 77).  SWO Intro was modeled after a 
three week leveling course taught in Newport, RI for graduates of Officer Candidate 
School (OCS).  The Navy would provide SWO Intro training to graduates of the Naval 
Academy and NROTC programs, in conjunction with Newport’s course for OCS 
graduates.  The Navy tasked the Afloat Training Groups (ATG) of each fleet 
concentration area (FCA) to administer this introductory course that would provide a 
baseline of professional knowledge to newly commissioned officers heading to the fleet 
(COMNAVSURFOR, 2010). 
After delivery to the fleet, ATGs began to leverage waterfront assets and 
incorporate hands on training in the form of “school ship” visits.  To accommodate the 
extra hands-on instruction, the three-week SWO Intro course was subsequently expanded 
to four weeks of classroom instruction, accompanied by an additional week of the 
Division Officer Leadership Course (DIVOLC) (Crawford, 2010).  As evidence that the 
Navy was taking SWO training more seriously, VADM Curtis released an 
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ALNAVSURFOR message prohibiting shipboard interference with students enrolled at 
SWO Intro:  “While students are enrolled in the SWO Intro class, they are TAD to ATG 
for the duration of the class and are accordingly exempt from any shipboard duties to 
include watches or assignment to a duty section.  Assigning a student to duty will result 
in disenrollment” (COMNAVSURFOR, 2010).    
Over the past decade, the SWO community has been tirelessly searching for the 
appropriate balance of classroom and shipboard training.  Attempts to reduce initial 
classroom training were met with resistance by those who envisioned a Navy with 
technically proficient DIVOs who report ready to lead.  However, later efforts to enhance 
classroom training met resistance from those who believed that the “death by Power 
Point” instruction method was ineffective.  The SWO community’s decade-long 
progression through three separate training methods has shown many that inadequate 
formal training does future DIVOs a disservice, while too much formal training might be 
wasteful and ineffective.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The purpose of this study is to answer the following questions: 
1) How is a first-tour DIVO’s value to the Navy determined? 
2) What is the Navy’s investment in first-tour DIVO OJT in terms of actual and 
desired officer proficiencies? 
3) How does the OJT investment under SWO Intro compare to previous versions 
of SWOS? 
4) What are the hidden costs of OJT? 
C. SCOPE, METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Scope 
The scope of this thesis is to estimate what the Navy invests in developing first-
tour DIVOs into SWOs.  This investment has changed over the past decade consequent to 
changes in initial SWO training.  The OJT investment will be calculated for SWO Intro, 
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and compared to the investment incurred during SWOSDOC and SWOS-at-Sea.  The 
monthly difference between the value of a fully qualified officer and an officer in training 
will be called the SWO OJT investment.  Officer proficiencies are a function of 
professional development prior to arrival to the ship (at the commissioning source and 
initial training command), incremental completion of SWO PQS, and final attainment of 
the SWO qualification. 
2. Methodology 
This investment estimation model will combine both quantitative and qualitative 
inputs.  The model will posit a monthly progress from initial baseline proficiency (one for 
each of the three training methods over the past decade).  The individual weight of each 
officer value category will depend on how much time a typical officer spends standing 
watch and doing administrative work.  Each month, as DIVOs accomplish more PQS 
(arguably becoming more effective at their jobs) their value to the Navy will increase.  
The rate at which this value increases is highly individual to each officer.  To correct for 
this, a standard learning curve will be estimated based on the nominal time to achieve 
OOD Underway (UW) qualification, as prescribed in current SURFOR guidance.  After 
estimating the time it takes to qualify as an OOD UW, the time to achieve SWO 
qualification can be approximated.  The officers’ derived value will be compared to their 
monthly cost to the Navy (measured by the Navy Ensign Composite Rate).  This thesis 
will then compute the average annual OJT investment per officer by multiplying the 
average monthly investment by the number of months to qualify SWO. 
3. Assumptions 
This thesis assumes that the Navy invests in first-tour DIVO development until 
the officer attains his/her SWO Qualification.  After qualification, the DIVO will still be 
learning, but is also contributing significantly to shipboard operations and mission.  It is 
reasonable to assume that the first-tour investment ends after SWO qualification.  
Additionally, as SWO qualification times are affected by a variety of factors that change 
from year to year, assumptions were made to predict how the qualification timelines of 
previous versions of SWOS would look today. 
 8
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
The SWO community’s continued search for the most effective combination of 
formal classroom and shipboard OJT was the impetus for this research.  A 2010 
Governmental Accountability Officer (GAO) report to Congress stated, “The Navy has 
evaluated the impact that its changes to training programs have had on the length and cost 
of training, but it lacks a broader range of performance measures needed to evaluate the 
impact on other key aspects, such as the trainees’ job performance” (GAO, 2010).  In 
support of the GAO’s observation, this thesis estimates shipboard training costs in terms 
of officer non-proficiency over the shipboard qualification period. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II surveys and synthesizes relevant literature in order to determine officer 
value upon arrival to the fleet.  Chapter III provides the methodology for arriving at 
initial officer values, establishes a timeline that serves as a basis for increasing officer 
values over time, determines the investment per officer, and compares the OJT 
investment associated with each version of SWOS.  Chapter IV integrates Chapters I 
through III, recommends changes to initial training to reduce the SWO OJT investment, 
and provides recommendations for future study. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature presented in this chapter will provide a theoretical underpinning for 
the investment calculation in Chapter III.  The SWO OJT investment calculation is based 
on officer proficiency levels, which in turn determine officer value.  An officer’s value 
after the attainment of the SWO qualification (full proficiency) is assumed equal to the 
Navy Ensign Composite Pay Rate.  Proficiency levels at an officer’s report date are less 
straightforward, as they depend on varying levels of commissioning source preparation 
and professional development during formal training.  This chapter explains the different 
commissioning sources and the three iterations of initial SWO training, and discusses 
relevant training studies that preface the calculations performed in this research.  
A. COMMISSIONING SOURCE PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
Each commissioning source prepares midshipmen or officer candidates differently 
for service in the Navy.  This thesis will approximate the professional development that 
occurs at each of the four commissioning sources, and how it affects first-tour DIVO 
proficiency levels. 
1. United States Naval Academy 
Established in 1845, the United States Naval Academy (USNA) was the Navy’s 
only commissioning source for naval officers until 1926.  Of all the commissioning 
sources, the Naval Academy offers the most robust preparation for service in the fleet in 
terms of dedicated professional training.  In addition to the core curriculum of 
engineering, science, mathematics, humanities and social science, midshipmen take a 
variety of professional military courses to prepare them for leadership in the fleet.  Many 
of the core engineering courses such as Principles of Propulsion, Principles of Ship 
Performance and Naval Weapons Systems are tailored toward the Navy, giving future 
SWOs a firm understanding of the topics that will require their understanding upon 
arrival to the fleet.  This research divides USNA professional development into four 
categories: general naval curriculum, SWO specific curriculum, Character Development 
and Training, and summer training. 
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a. General Naval Curriculum 
As part of midshipmen’s professional military education, they are 
expected to complete a foundation of general naval courses that will support them 
throughout their careers.  While the course offerings may change slightly throughout the 
years, they ultimately aim to provide a broad understanding of the challenges that await 
in the fleet.  These courses include Leadership and Human Behavior, Ethics and Moral 
Reasoning for the Naval Leader, Strategy and Tactics, Leadership Theory and 
Application, and Law for the Junior Officer (USNA, 2011).  This general naval 
curriculum provides all graduates (particularly SWOs, who have the shortest training 
pipeline and must put to practice these skills the earliest) with an understanding of 
leadership, and the context in which it is used.  While dominance of these topics is not 
required to attain a SWO qualification, it ensures a solid foundation from which to 
approach a career of naval service. 
b. SWO Specific Curriculum 
While the general naval curriculum provides midshipmen with a 
foundation of leadership education, the SWO specific curriculum imbues them with the 
skills required of a mariner.  All midshipmen are required to take courses in Basic 
Seamanship, Introduction to Navigation, and Advanced Navigation to learn the principles 
of safe ship handling.  Topics covered in these courses include International Regulations 
for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) Rules of the Road, nautical chart 
preparation, underway training on yard patrol craft (YPs), bridge simulator training, and 
maneuvering boards (USNA, 2011).  In addition to these required courses, midshipmen 
who “service select” SWO prior to graduation must complete a Surface Warfare 
Practicum in their final semester at the Academy.  The Academy designed the practicum 
to familiarize future SWOs with surface platforms, DIVO administration, zone 
inspections, basic damage control, maneuvering boards, Officer of the Deck 
fundamentals, and the SWO career path. 
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c. Character Development and Training 
In addition to formal classroom instruction, midshipmen are immersed in a 
20-week Navy professional knowledge study program that provides a working 
knowledge of the Navy and Marine Corps’ missions, organization and capabilities.  The 
Character Development and Training program is designed to teach first-year students 
(Plebes) about the Navy they are inheriting.  Each subsequent rank of midshipmen has a 
responsibility to train Plebes during regular review periods throughout the year.  While 
the focus of the pro-knowledge review is on the Plebes, all midshipmen (regardless of 
rank) must stay current on these topics to maintain and foster an effective learning 
environment.  Over the course of four years, this program ensures nearly constant 
exposure to Navy pro-knowledge that provides graduates with a “working knowledge of 
the Navy and Marine Corps‘ missions, organization and capabilities” (USNA, 2011). 
d. Summer Training 
Summer training is another opportunity for future SWOs to develop 
professionally prior to arrival at their first ship.  According to the USNA website, “Eight 
weeks of annual summer training introduces midshipmen to operational units of the Navy 
and Marine Corps, life at sea and the responsibilities of a junior officer” (USNA, 2011).  
Academy summer training places midshipmen in various parts of the world to experience 
real fleet operations, and ensure they have the right information on which to base service 
selection.  For midshipmen who have already decided on a career path, it provides them a 
head start in learning about their community.  However, summer training experiences 
vary widely throughout the Academy, making it difficult to determine to what extent 
summer training is SWO-related (USNA, 2011). 
2. Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps 
According to its website, “the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) 
was established in 1926 to provide a broad base of citizens knowledgeable in the arts and 
sciences of Naval Warfare” (NETC, 2011).  NROTC works in partnership with civilian 
universities to commission naval officers for service in the Navy and Marine Corps.  
While NROTC serves as a valuable means to produce future leaders of the Navy, it is not 
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designed to prepare them professionally to the extent that the Academy does. LCDR 
James Robinson highlighted the primary differences between the Academy and NROTC, 
stating  
The Academy midshipmen attended an institution devoted solely to 
producing naval officers… Contrasting sharply with this, midshipmen 
attending NROTC were only partially immersed in a naval culture. 
(Robinson, 2008, p. 24) 
NROTC units, while often outstanding institutions, generally do not have the 
same resources as the Academy to train midshipmen, as evidenced by its use of consortia.  
NROTC units in larger metropolitan areas often form consortia to pool the resources of 
larger units to train smaller “cross town” units.  Additionally, NROTC midshipmen are 
free to live off campus when they are not in class or training with the unit.  The Academy 
requires midshipmen to reside in the dormitory, an environment characterized by constant 
professional development and military indoctrination. 
a. Naval Science Curriculum and Summer Training 
The intent of NROTC’s Naval Science Curriculum is to provide 
midshipmen with the professional education needed for successful careers in the Navy.  
The Naval Service Training Command Instruction (NSTCINST) 1533.2A dictates the 
courses required of a typical NROTC graduate (NSTC, 2011).  There are other course 
offerings in addition to the following, which are not discussed as they are not mandatory 
for “Navy option” midshipmen.  In their freshman year, midshipmen take courses in 
Naval Science and Seapower and Maritime Affairs.  As sophomores, midshipmen take a 
Leadership and Management course, along with an introduction to Navigation.  Junior 
year course offerings include Weapons and Engineering.  Seniors take courses in Naval 
Operations and Seamanship, and Leadership and Ethics.  Additionally, midshipmen are 
required to take an annual Naval Science Laboratory that covers miscellaneous topics not 
covered in formal Naval Science Courses, but of relative importance to the Navy.  A 
review of Naval Science Curriculum revealed that Navigation, Weapons, Engineering, 
and Naval Operations and Seamanship courses provide some level of SWO-specific 
training. 
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NROTC summer training provides a brief introduction to fleet operations.  
During the summer following their freshman year, midshipmen participate in Career 
Orientation and Training for Midshipmen (CORTRAMID) to provide introductions to the 
submarine, surface, aviation and Marine Corps warfare areas.  According to NSTCINST 
1533.2A, second class summer training on surface ships and submarines, “furnishes 
midshipmen with basic shipboard orientation and an introduction to enlisted life and the 
roles of the work center supervisor” (NSTC, 2011).  The following summer prior to 
graduation, midshipmen gain exposure to the officer and wardroom environment onboard 
ships, submarines, or in an aviation squadron.  A comparison of USNA and NROTC 
summer training cruise lengths indicate that NROTC summer training is half the length 
of USNA’s summer training (Academy, 2011; NSTC, 2011). 
3. Officer Candidate School 
Officer Candidate School (OCS) is another commissioning source available to 
college graduates who want to pursue careers as naval officers.  Located in Newport, 
Rhode Island, OCS is the Navy’s only commissioning source that requires candidates to 
already have undergraduate degrees.  Thus, OCS can provide 12 weeks of continuous 
officer indoctrination without interruption from academic instruction.  During the 12 
week course, officer candidates complete ten units of professional instruction covering 
the following topics: engineering, military indoctrination, navigation, seamanship, 
damage control, naval leadership, basic/fleet officer curriculum, military law, naval 
warfare, and special programs (OTC, 2011).   
Upon receiving their officer commission, graduates then undergo further technical 
training specific to their warfare community.  Those who have selected the SWO 
community proceed directly to Surface Warfare Officer School Command’s 




4. Seaman to Admiral-21 and Lateral Transfers 
According to the Seaman to Admiral-21 website, “The STA-21 Commissioning 
Program is designed to meet the goals of the Navy in the 21st Century, while at the same 
time creating a fair and equitable system for outstanding active duty Sailors to receive a 
top-notch college education and become commissioned officers” (Navy, 2011).  Active 
duty Sailors who are accepted into STA-21 must complete an 8-week Naval Science 
Institute (NSI) course designed to teach them the fundamental concepts of being a Naval 
Officer.  After NSI, STA-21 officer candidates must complete their bachelor’s degree 
within 36 months.  While at school, STA-21 candidates must participate in NROTC unit 
functions, but are exempt from summer training and Naval Science courses covered by 
the NSI curriculum.  Following commissioning, officer candidates undergo the initial 
training required by their community (Navy, 2011). 
The Navy allows a small percentage of officers each year to transfer out of their 
current communities into a new one of their choosing.  Although accounting for a 
relatively small percentage of SWO accessions, this program is valuable in that it retains 
officers that meet the Navy’s core values.  Additionally, the arduous application process 
suggests that the gaining warfare community is receiving a highly motivated officer into 
their corps.  By definition, all lateral transfers have prior Navy experience, suggesting 
further benefit to the SWO community. 
B. SWO PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION STANDARDS (PQS) 
One result of the merger of surface type commands by Admiral Zumwalt in the 
mid-1970s was the improvement of surface training standards.  In 1973, the combined 
Atlantic and Pacific Fleets promulgated the CinCPacFlt/CinCLantFlt Instruction 1412.1, 
which for the first time since the establishment of the Navy defined the professional 
qualification requirements of a SWO (Vion, 1978).  By 1980, the combined surface type 
commanders had fully developed SWO PQS, and integrated them into the SWO Basic 
Course (Robinson, 2008).  The introduction of PQS to SWO training ensured uniformity 
in the qualification process, and clearly set forth the professional expectations of a SWO.  
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The PQS program manager Naval Education and Training Command (NETC, or 
NAVEDTRA) defines it as, 
A qualification system for officers and enlisted personnel where 
certification of a minimum level of competency is required prior to 
qualifying to perform specific duties. A PQS is a compilation of the 
minimum knowledge and skills that an individual must demonstrate in 
order to qualify to stand watches or perform other specific routine duties 
necessary for the safety, security or proper operation of a ship, aircraft or 
support system. (NETC, 2004) 
This would suggest that PQS progress provides a good measure of first-tour 
DIVO proficiency, and consequently value.  While PQS progress may not be a 
measurement of watchstanding prowess, by NETC definition a DIVO’s placement on the 
watchbill indicates they have met the minimum requirements to be trusted with the 
watch.  Additional watchstanders add value by creating extra time in the watch rotation 
or shortening existing watches, which eases the burden on shipboard personnel. 
However, an officer can provide value without attaining a full PQS qualification.  
Watchstanders still in training can serve as mentors to new watchstanders.  The Conning 
Officer (an OOD UW in training who issues orders to the helmsman) does not require 
PQS qualification, yet is the watchstander directly responsible for the safe maneuvering 
of the ship.  An experienced Conning Officer can manage the operation of a bridge 
watchsection, allowing the OOD to concentrate on navigational safety or operational 
planning.  For this reason, a watchstander who has completed some of the requirements 
necessary for qualification can still demonstrate incremental proficiency, and adds value 
to the ship as a result.  In short, incremental progress towards PQS completion is included 
in the proficiency calculation. 
1. Fundamentals, Systems, and Watchstations 
The changes to initial SWO training over the past decade had implications for the 
intended use of PQS.  NAVEDTRA PQS documents explain how the qualification 
process is organized,  
PQS is divided into three sections.  The 100 Section (Fundamentals) 
contains the fundamental knowledge from technical manuals and other 
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texts necessary to satisfactorily understand the watchstation/workstation 
duties.  The 200 Section (Systems) is designed to acquaint you with the 
systems you will be required to operate at your watchstation/workstation.  
The 300 Section (Watchstations) lists the tasks you will be required to 
satisfactorily perform in order to achieve final PQS qualification for a 
particular watchstation/workstation. (NETC, 2004)  
At SWOSDOC, the Fundamentals and Systems sections of PQS formed the curriculum 
backbone (Navy, 1980).  During SWOS-at-Sea, the Fundamentals and Systems sections 
of PQS were validated by completing shipboard CBT modules (COMNAVSURFOR, 
2011).  The SWO Intro curriculum reincorporated some of the 100- and 200-level PQS 
items, but SURFOR guidance states that completion of shipboard CBT modules 
eliminates the requirement to complete them (COMNAVSURFOR, 2011). 
The core SWO PQS requirements have generally stayed the same since their 
establishment in the mid-1970s, but may change to accommodate the changing 
operational environment.  One such example is the Antiterrorism Tactical Watch Officer 
(ATWO) watchstation, which was added as a PQS requirement in 2011 in response to 
continued overseas contingency operations.  The addition is reflected in the most recent 
requirements defined in the Commander Naval Surface Force Instruction 
(COMNAVSURFORINST) 1412.1C, outlined in Table 1.  Note that some of the PQS 




PQS NAVEDTRA Series Watchstations Type
Basic Damage Control 43119 301-306 Admin
Maintenance and Material Management System 43241 304 Admin
Division Officer Afloat 43463 Admin
SWO Engineering 43101-3 Watch
Inport Officer of the Deck 43397 Watch
     M9 Service Pistol 43466-D Pre-requisite
Small Boat Officer 43152 Watch
Combat Information Center Watch Officer 43101 Watch
     CMS User 43462-B 301 Pre-requisite
     Mk 164 Control Panel Operator 43341-F 303 Pre-requisite
Antiterrorism Tactical Watch Officer 43385-9 Watch
Underway Officer of the Deck 43101 Watch
     Helm/Aftersteering Safety Officer 43492-2D 306 Pre-requisite  
Table 1.   Minimum SWO Qualification PQS Requirements (From: 
COMNAVSURFOR, 2011) 
2. PQS Categories: Watch and Admin 
First-tour DIVOs’ primary responsibilities are to become fully qualified 
watchstanders, and to ensure that the administration of their divisions is sound.  Based on 
analysis of the Navy Manpower Manual OPNAVINST 1000.16K, it seems reasonable to 
classify DIVO requirements into two general categories: Watches and Admin.  This 
thesis considers PQS a “Watch” if it requires DIVOs to be placed on a watchbill, and 
“Admin” if it assists them in the execution of their administrative duties, but precludes 
placement on a watchbill. 
The OPNAVINST 1000.16K divides a standard Navy workweek (NSW) into time 
devoted to “watchstanding” and time devoted to “work in addition to watchstanding” 
(OPNAV, 2007).  A SWO’s value to the Navy depends greatly on how they spend their 
day (on watch, or handling division administration), and the proficiency with which they 
complete such tasks.  While it is impossible to know with what proficiency individual 
officers accomplish required tasks, PQS progress provides a good estimation of a DIVO’s 
training level.  It is important to note that the NSW was not meant to apply to officers.  
However, it still provides a good estimation of the general work expected of shipboard 
personnel. 
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C. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING 
A 2007 study of Air Force training concluded that as initial training was reduced, 
productivity during OJT decreased (Manacapilli, Bailey, Beighley, Bennett, & Bower, 
2007).  This suggests that similar changes to initial SWO training would be correlated to 
changes in initial DIVO proficiency levels.  Heavy front-end, PQS-based training implies 
a head start in the qualification process for young officers, which raises initial proficiency 
levels.  Less initial training implies that DIVOs arrive to the ship with less formal 
preparation and, consequently, lower initial proficiencies.  This section illustrates the 
changes to initial SWO training over the past decade, and serves as the foundation for the 
investment calculation in Chapter III.  
1. SWOSDOC 
SWOSDOC (initially called SWO Basic, and then SWDOC) was the first iteration 
of fleet-wide initial SWO training.  The Navy implemented SWOSDOC in 1970 to 
provide prospective DIVOs with the standardized training that would prepare them for 
duty aboard ship.  SWOSDOC instruction was designed to teach SWO PQS required of 
first-tour DIVOs.  Utilizing the “train to qualify” concept, SWOSDOC taught the 100– 
and 200–level PQS items, leaving responsibility for the 300–level training and 
qualification to the ship’s CO.  In this way, each officer graduated from SWOSDOC with 
the majority of their prerequisite work completed, ready to begin watchstanding duties on 
their ship.  LCDR Robinson summarized the purpose of SWO Basic, “to produce SWO 
candidates who possessed a firm grasp of the theory and principles of the SWO 
profession so they could more quickly qualify once they arrived onboard their ships” 
(Robinson, 2008, p. 54). 
2. SWOS-at-Sea 
In 2003, the Navy implemented a new training program that combined shipboard 
CBT and OJT, called SWOS-at-Sea.  The SWOSDOC curriculum, condensed into a CBT 
format called SWOS-at-Sea 2.0, was provided to all DIVOs upon arrival at the ship 
(Rocci, 2003).  The Navy designed SWOS-at-Sea 2.0 to serve as a lesson plan that, when 
supplemented by OJT, would guide DIVOs toward their SWO qualification.  SWOS-at-
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Sea was intended to give officers more time onboard ship by eliminating the long initial 
training pipeline (Navy, 2002).  After achieving an Officer of the Deck Underway 
qualification, DIVOs were sent to the three-week Advanced Shiphandling and Tactics 
Course (ASAT), a leveling school that provided all DIVOs with the tactical knowledge 
and shiphandling skills required of a fully qualified SWO.  For the first time in over 30 
years DIVOs were sent to their ships without formal training, or introduction to SWO 
PQS (Navy, 2002). 
Criticisms of SWOS-at-Sea are varied.  Surveys of DIVOs at ASAT have 
indicated that SWO CBT was easily “gamed,” indicating that there were ways of cutting 
corners for the sake of quick completion (Crawford, 2010).  SWOS-at-Sea virtually 
eliminated formalized SWO training, leaving behind hopeful optimism that first-tour 
DIVOs would take their CBT program seriously amongst the already-stringent demands 
of shipboard life.  DIVOs reporting to their ships during this period were completely 
green, and often sought training from anyone who would provide it.  Some officers 
criticized ASAT for offering shiphandling practice via simulator after she had already 
learned how to drive onboard ship (Shovlin, 2008).  
3. SWO Intro 
In 2008, the surface community reestablished initial DIVO training across the 
fleet to deliver the formal training the waterfront was requesting.  SWO Intro, an 
adaptation of a course already being provided for OCS graduates in Newport, is a four 
week course taught on the waterfront by ATG.  Following SWO Intro, prospective 
DIVOs complete a week-long leadership course taught by the Center for Personal and 
Professional Development (CPPD).  Naval Academy and NROTC graduates attend the 
ATG courses, while OCS graduates complete the same course in Newport, RI.  A 2008 
naval message from Vice Admiral Curtis explained SWO Intro’s purpose, “to provide our 
new accession USNA and NROTC officers the basic building fundamentals and skills 
required to excel in their billets and build professional relationships with peers and 
waterfront experts at ATG and other organizations” (COMNAVSURFOR, 2008). 
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One benefit of SWO Intro’s proximity to fleet assets is that it facilitates 
incorporation of “hands on” shipboard training to its formalized classroom curriculum.  
In fact, the San Diego course taught by ATG Pacific dedicates a significant amount of 
time to practical training, touring ships, practicing zone inspections, riding in rigid hull 
inflatable boats, and earning their 9 mm Pistol and 2nd Class Swim qualifications.  SWO 
Intro aims to provide a general understanding of shipboard life, DIVO expectations, the 
qualification process, and other useful skills that SWOS-at-Sea did not offer.  
Additionally, SWO Intro sends a PQS validation letter to the DIVO’s commanding 
officers, recommending the Fundamentals and Systems-level PQS that can be “signed 
off” upon their arrival.  A sample PQS validation table can be found in Appendix A.  
While a four-week course precludes thorough instruction on all relevant surface warfare 
topics, SWO Intro aims to prepare DIVOs for at least the basics of shipboard life. 
In spite of SWO Intro’s numerous advantages over SWOS-at-Sea, it is still not 
functioning as anticipated.  In her study Process Evaluation of SWOS Division Officer 
Training, Alice Crawford interviewed over 100 SWOs to gain an understanding of the 
current state of SWO training.  Crawford recommended that SWO Intro be taught by 
officers with instructor specialty codes.  Currently, ATG considers SWO Intro instruction 
a collateral duty.  SURFOR guidance requires that all DIVOs attend the course within 
three months of arriving onboard ship, unless prohibited by the ship’s operational 
schedule (COMNAVSURFOR, 2010).  Several officers said they reported to training 
after completing deployments, which at that point made the course too basic relative to 
their shipboard experience.  Crawford recommends that officers take SWO Intro training 
prior to reporting onboard ship, as it would relieve the training burden on the ships and 
provide them with a more “standard ensign” (Crawford, 2010). 
4. On-the-Job Training 
If commissioning source preparation and initial SWO training determine initial 
officer proficiency levels, and attainment of a SWO qualification equates to full 
proficiency, then OJT determines the learning curve that connects both points.  The last 
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section discussed determinants of initial and final first–tour DIVO proficiencies.  The 
next section will present relevant literature on OJT. 
To a certain extent, nearly all jobs require OJT.  Regardless of the thoroughness 
of initial job training, there are certain aspects of a job that must be learned through 
actual experience.  Captain Steven Davis cautioned that there is no substitution for 
shiphandling other than actually driving a warship (Davis, 2007, p. 42).  Captain Davis 
voiced what many SWOs have come to realize, that no amount of classroom or simulator 
training can prepare you for the stresses of a pier landing, or refueling at sea.   
Literature classifies OJT as either structured or unstructured.  Structured OJT was 
originally defined by Dr. Ronald Jacobs of Ohio State University as “a planned process 
of developing competence… by having an experienced employee train a novice 
employee at the work setting or a location that closely resembles the work setting” 
(Jacobs, 2003).  Dr. Robert Ketchum defines unstructured OJT as “follow Joe or Jenny 
around” where the person is expected to “sink or swim” (Group, 2011). 
Survey results from a 2009 study of SWO CBT suggest that SWO OJT is 
unstructured.  Surveyed officers said as newly arriving DIVOs they were typically given 
mentors who had no training qualifications other than their own shipboard experience 
(Bowman & Crawford, 2009, p. 29).  When asked if given the proper support in 
completing SWO CBT, one officer responded, “Everyone was just too busy, and we were 
just sort of left to figure things out by ourselves” (Bowman & Crawford, 2009, p. 37). 
Another officer indicated that his Training Officer was not even involved in the process.  
Interviews with post-command Captains from the NPS show that DIVO mentors often 
have little experience themselves.  Bowman et al. caution that SWO OJT can become a 
low priority for the mentors who are already overworked as it is.  The study revealed that 
SWOS-at-Sea was not emphasized by shipboard leadership and required structure before 
it could be a successful training program. 
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III. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
This chapter calculates the OJT investment during SWO Intro, and compares it to 
the OJT investment associated with SWOSDOC and SWOS-at-Sea.  To be an accurate 
comparison, SWOSDOC and SWOS-at-Sea investment calculations utilize current 
Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO), manpower levels, and training culture.  First, the model 
determines first-tour DIVO proficiencies resulting from commissioning source 
preparation and initial officer training.  Then, it establishes a learning curve that brings 
DIVOs from initial to full proficiency (measured by SWO qualification).  Finally, it 
calculates the OJT investment by converting officer proficiencies into monetary value 
and subtracting them from the Navy Composite Rate.  The investment is calculated 
monthly, decreases as DIVOs move up the learning curve, and ends after attainment of 
SWO qualification. 
A. ESTABLISHING INITIAL PROFICIENCIES 
Initial first-tour DIVO proficiency is a function of how well commissioning 
source preparation and initial officer training has prepared them for shipboard duties.  
Initial officer training provides the most objective measure of proficiency, as its learning 
objectives mirror SWO PQS.  Commissioning source effects are harder to approximate as 
learning objectives are not based on SWO PQS, and are divided amongst the other 
warfare areas as well.  Expected workload is based on the NSW and ship deployment 
schedules.  Finally, the work required of first-tour DIVOs will be compared to their PQS 
progress in this area to estimate initial proficiency levels. 
1. Navy Standard Workweek 
This research classifies PQS consistent with Appendix C of the Manual of Navy 
Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures, which classifies the work comprising the 
NSW (OPNAV, 2007).  As mentioned before, the NSW, while not intended to apply to 
officers, still provides a good estimation of the general work expected of shipboard 
personnel.  According to Appendix C, the NSW is devoted to either “watchstanding” 
(watch) or “work in addition to watchstanding” (admin).  When deployed, officers devote 
 24
more time to watchstanding and less time to administrative work.  When in port, the 
administrative workload increases as there are fewer watches to stand while moored.  
Thus, the average deployment cycles and the standard workweek must be considered 
when approximating the average workload balance between Watch and Admin.  Once it 
is established how officers spend their time, the weighted importance of Watch and 
Admin PQS progress can be determined. 
a. Ships Underway 
Appendix C assumes that deployed warships operate in Condition III 
(Wartime/Deployed Cruising Readiness) on a three-section watch basis while underway.  
The deployed NSW allows for 70 hours of productive work.  Of those 70 hours, 56 hours 
are allocated to watchstanding, and 14 are allocated to administrative work.  This time 
allocation was used to approximate the work schedule for non-deployed ships underway 
as well. 
b. Ships in Port 
Appendix C does not calculate a NSW for shipboard personnel in port, but 
does provide a calculation for ashore military personnel in the Continental United States 
(CONUS).  Ashore military personnel are allowed 33.38 hours of productive work, once 
service diversion such as inspections and quarters is factored out.  To make this 
applicable to shipboard personnel, this calculation must account for additional time spent 
standing watch while on duty.  In his thesis, Training Costs for Junior Surface Warfare 
Officers, Michael Makee determined that shipboard duty adds 10 hours to an in port 
workweek while in CONUS (assuming six section duty), and 20 hours to an in port 
workweek while outside of CONUS (assuming three section duty) (Makee, 1999, p. 29). 
2. Ship Deployment Cycle 
Ships operate according to a notional 24 month deployment cycle.  According to 
the Surface Force Training Manual (SURFORTRAMAN) 3502.1D, the deployment cycle 
is typically comprised of an 18-month Inter-deployment Training Cycle (IDTC) followed 
by a six-month deployment (COMNAVSURFOR, 2007).  While emerging operational 
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requirements may supersede this schedule for individual ships, the Navy defaults to this 
timeline for typical ship maintenance and training purposes.  Figure 1, taken from the 
SURFORTRAMAN, provides an illustration of the typical deployment cycle. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Notional 24 Month Deployment Cycle (From: COMNAVSURFOR, 2007) 
3. Determining Workload 
DIVO workload estimations are based on the NSW and a typical ship deployment 
cycle.  The 24 month deployment cycle constitutes eight quarters.  The first six quarters 
are devoted to training, the last two quarters to deployment.  As each quarter has 13 
weeks (91.25 days), the typical ship spends 78 weeks in the IDTC and 26 weeks on 
deployment.  In 2011, the Navy budgeted for enough fuel to support an OPTEMPO of 45 
underway days per quarter for deployed forces, and 20 underway days per quarter for 
non-deployed forces (Comptroller, 2010).  Thus, budgets support a total of 90 underway 
days and 92.5 in port days during a typical deployment, and support 120 underway days 
and 427.5 in port days for ships during the IDTC.  A simple conversion yields 12.8 weeks 
underway and 13.2 weeks in port while deployed, and 17.0 weeks underway and 61.0 
weeks in port during IDTC.  By multiplying the average ship schedule by the standard 
workweek calculations in the previous section, the average percent time devoted to 
Watch and Admin was determined (Table 2).  In short, these time allocation percentages 
determine the relative weight of the Watch and Admin value categories.  For example, 
the Admin value category discussed in the next section will account for 53.2 percent of 
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Table 2.   SWO Time Allocation (After: Gavino, 2002) 
4. Value Categories 
First-tour DIVOs are expected to become fully qualified watchstanders and 
manage the administration duties of their division.  While Navy PQS progress can 
approximate proficiency at these skills, it is not the only component of the value 
calculation.  The model breaks down the Watch and Admin value categories into 
subcategories to account for commissioning source effects, and the general skills that 
college graduates should possess. 
a. Admin Value Category 
This research assumes similarities between shipboard administrative work 
and administrative work conducted in other workplaces.  Standard DIVO tasks include 
routing naval correspondence, representing the division at meetings, and handling 
divisional personnel issues.  These responsibilities approximate what most low-level 
managers should be expected to demonstrate after graduation, and with little formal 
training.  This thesis argues that college equips all first-tour DIVOs with general 
managerial skills, a component in the Admin value category. 
However, first-tour DIVOs are not just “paper pushers.”  SWO 
administrative work that requires formal or shipboard training can be found in the 
following PQS: Damage Control (DC), Maintenance and Material Management (3M), 
and ship-specific systems and programs of DIVO Afloat.  Thus, certain aspects of DIVO 
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administration require skills that most college graduates should possess, while other 
aspects require formal PQS training on Navy specific systems and programs. 
b. Watch Value Category 
Unlike Admin work, shipboard watches require very specific skill sets 
that, most likely, have not been cultivated in prior employment or undergraduate 
experience.  Nowhere in the private sector can one recreate the highly unique experience 
of standing watch on a warship.  As a result, this thesis assumes that DIVOs arrive 
onboard with no other Watch skill set in addition to what the Navy has provided them in 
formal SWO training. 
3. Initial Officer Proficiency Determination 
Initial officer proficiencies (IOP) are determined by adding the proficiency gained 
at the commissioning source to the proficiency gained during initial training.   
a. Proficiency Gained at Commissioning Source 
Commissioning source effects must be accounted for when calculating 
IOPs.  Based on a work in progress by Crawford and Bowman (2011) that conducted 
focus groups and interviews of officers on 15 ships and three ATGs (including 145 junior 
officers, 117 senior enlisted, 53 department heads, 12 COs and 12 XOs), graduates of the 
Naval Academy are widely considered better prepared upon reporting to the ship than 
those from NROTC, who are better prepared than cadets from OCS (Crawford & 
Bowman, 2011).  This is consistent with the literature review, which indicates that 
graduates of the Naval Academy, relative to NROTC and OCS, are provided the most 
professional development instruction prior to commissioning.  Similarly, NROTC 
midshipmen have more undergraduate professional development than OCS cadets, whose 
commissioning source professional development is limited to 12 weeks of military 
indoctrination training.  This thesis considers SWO officer accessions via STA-21 or 
Lateral Transfer Program equally prepared for shipboard duty as Academy graduates 
because of their previous naval service.  For simplicity, the values applied in this section 
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are generally assumed as an in-depth qualitative analysis for each commissioning source 
with respect to relevant SWO training was outside the scope of this thesis. 
Proficiency gained at the commissioning source is classified as either 
Navy Familiarization (NF) or General Managerial Skills (GMS).  The different degrees 
of commissioning source professional development are accounted for by applying 
corresponding NF values.  In other words, SWO accessions from the Naval Academy, 
STA-21 and Lateral Transfer Programs are expected to be initially more proficient at 
their jobs than NROTC graduates, who are expected to be more proficient than OCS 
graduates (Crawford & Bowman, 2011).  The research assumed that the NF should not 
exceed 10 percent of the overall officer proficiency.  This 10 percent is divided further 
into NF Watch and Admin components, 4.68 and 5.32 percent, respectively 
(proportionate to the SWO time allocation from Table 2).   
Commissioning source differences are only apparent when initial SWO 
training is limited.  Prior to 2003, graduates went to six months of formal training prior to 
arrival at their ship.  It is reasonable to assume that any initial advantages provided by 
commissioning source would be indiscernible after graduation from SWOSDOC.  
Conversely, during the SWOS-at-Sea initiative commissioning source effects were 
apparent as graduates received no formal training (other than a couple of weeks at billet 
specialty training) prior to reporting onboard.  Lastly, one might argue that one month of 
SWO Intro training would be insufficient to completely “level out” commissioning 
source affects.  However, SWO Intro provides considerably more training than did 
SWOS-at-Sea. 
The research assumes that SWOSDOC completely leveled commissioning 
source differences, and gave its graduates an advantage over those who graduated from 
later versions of SWOS.  Consequently, SWOSDOC graduates receive an NF value of 10 
percent.  For simplicity, the following NF values were assumed for SWOS-at-Sea 
accessions in accordance with their commissioning sources: 10 percent for USNA, STA-
21 and Lateral Transfers, 5 percent for NROTC, and 2 percent for OCS.  Finally, NF 
values of 10, 7.5 and 5 percent were assumed for SWO Intro to show that some leveling 
occurred.  These adjustments are displayed in Table 3. 
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SWOSDOC USNA NROTC OCS STA-21
Lateral 
Transfer
Initial Proficiency Weights 1 1 1 1 1
Added Value to Watch 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047
Added Value to Admin 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053
Navy Familiarization Value 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
SWOS-AT-SEA USNA NROTC OCS STA-21
Lateral 
Transfer
Initial Proficiency Weights 1 0.5 0.2 1 1
Added Value to Watch 0.047 0.023 0.009 0.047 0.047
Added Value to Admin 0.053 0.027 0.011 0.053 0.053
Navy Familiarization Value 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.10
SWO Intro USNA NROTC OCS STA-21
Lateral 
Transfer
Initial Proficiency Weights 1 0.75 0.5 1 1
Added Value to Watch 0.047 0.035 0.023 0.047 0.047
Added Value to Admin 0.053 0.040 0.027 0.053 0.053
Navy Familiarization Value 0.10 0.075 0.05 0.10 0.10  
Table 3.   Commissioning Source Contribution to Officer Value 
As officers are trained aboard ship this initial advantage becomes less apparent.  After 
officers attain their SWO qualification, it is assumed there is no perceived proficiency 
difference generated from commissioning source. 
Second, all college graduates are expected to read, write, and think 
critically, which this research classifies as General Managerial Skills (GMS).  For this 
reason, no officer shows up at the fleet with a proficiency of zero.  Arguably, they should 
be able attend meetings, route naval correspondence, and generally serve as an 
information conduit up and down the chain of command.  GMS, an important component 
of the officer proficiency calculation, is particularly administrative in nature.  Thus, 
unlike Navy Familiarization skills, it is not split between Watch and Admin categories.  
GMS values will be established later in the chapter. 
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b. Proficiency Gained at Initial Training 
Formal training learning outcomes contribute the most to the initial 
proficiency calculation.  As mentioned in the literature review, initial SWO training 
teaches the Fundamental and Systems-level PQS requirements, leaving the Watchstation 
PQS to be taught on the ship.  An analysis of SWO PQS documents found that NETC 
allocates a completion percentage value to each section of PQS completed, which makes 
the proficiency calculation quite objective.  Table 4 uses the Basic Damage Control PQS 
(Watchstation 306) to show the conversion of initial training outcomes to officer 
proficiencies.  The Fundamentals and Systems-level PQS line items each account for 5 
percent of the watchstation, leaving 90 percent of the PQS to be learned while standing 
the watch.  Officers were taught all 100– and 200–level PQS at SWOSDOC.  They 
received no formal training during SWOS-at-Sea.  They received training on some, but 
not all, of the 100– and 200–level PQS during SWO Intro.  Thus, SWOSDOC and SWO 
Intro delivered officers with 10 percent and 4 percent of their Basic DC PQS already 
complete. 
PQS Line % of Watchstation SWOSDOC At-Sea Intro SWOSDOC At-Sea Intro
104 1 1 - 1 1 0 1
107 1 1 - 1 1 0 1
110 1 1 - 1 1 0 1
111 1 1 - 0 1 0 0
113 1 1 - 0 1 0 0
202 1 1 - 1 1 0 1
214 1 1 - 0 1 0 0
216 1 1 - 0 1 0 0
217 1 1 - 0 1 0 0
224 1 1 - 0 1 0 0
306.2 50 0 - 0 0 0 0
306.3 12 0 - 0 0 0 0
306.4 4 0 - 0 0 0 0
306.5 12 0 - 0 0 0 0
306.6 12 0 - 0 0 0 0
Totals 100 10 0 4
% OF PQS COMPLETEDBASIC DC (306) PQS
1= Yes: 0= No
TAUGHT IN INITIAL TRAINING
 
Table 4.   Basic Damage Control PQS Completion Percentages 
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This research weights progress on individual PQS consistent with its size.  
All NAVEDTRA PQS documents provide a recommended “time to completion” for each 
watchstation, an indication of level of undertaking.  Thus, Basic DC Watchstation 306 
(four weeks) is given a smaller weight relative to larger PQS like OOD UW (26 weeks).  
In this case, aggregating all SWO PQS times to completion equals 139.33 weeks.  It is 
important to note that, as various PQS can be completed simultaneously, this time does 
not determine time to reach SWO qualification.  The recommended time to complete 
Basic DC Watchstation 306 equates to 2.9 percent of all PQS as indicated in the “PQS 
Weight” column in Table 5.  Multiplying the “PQS weight” with initial training 
“Progress” yields the “Weighted Progress” in the right column.  The weighted progress is 
aggregated for each training method to determine PQS completion percentages resulting 
from initial training.   

























WATCH Small Boat Officer 8 0.057 27.0% 0.0% 3.0% 1.6% 0.0% 0.2%
WATCH OOD Inport 6 0.043 17.0% 0.0% 5.0% 0.7% 0.0% 0.2%
WATCH      M9 Service Pistol 4 0.029 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.9%
WATCH SWO Engineering 12 0.086 52.0% 0.0% 6.0% 4.5% 0.0% 0.5%
WATCH CIC Watch Officer 26 0.187 25.0% 0.0% 5.5% 4.7% 0.0% 1.0%
WATCH      CMS User 301 6 0.043 58.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.5% 0.0% 0.0%
WATCH      Mk 164 Control Panel Operator 6 0.043 73.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0%
WATCH OOD Underway 26 0.187 29.0% 0.0% 12.0% 5.4% 0.0% 2.2%
WATCH      Helm/Aftersteering Safety Officer 4 0.029 21.0% 0.0% 3.0% 0.6% 0.0% 0.1%
23.1% 0.0% 7.1%
ADMIN Basic DC 301 2 0.014 15.0% 0.0% 15.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.2%
ADMIN Basic DC 302 2 0.014 5.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
ADMIN Basic DC 303 4 0.029 11.0% 0.0% 2.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.1%
ADMIN Basic DC 304 2 0.014 7.0% 0.0% 7.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1%
ADMIN Basic DC 305 2 0.014 25.0% 0.0% 5.0% 0.4% 0.0% 0.1%
ADMIN Basic DC 306 4 0.029 10.0% 0.0% 4.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.1%
ADMIN 3M 304 8 0.057 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
ADMIN DIVO Afloat 17.33 0.124 58.0% 0.0% 48.0% 7.2% 0.0% 6.0%
8.6% 0.0% 6.5%




Table 5.   PQS Progress by Initial Training Source 
This research excluded Billet Specialty Training’s (BST) contribution to 
officer value as different billets call for different levels of training.  Additionally, BST 
learning outcomes are not necessarily based on SWO PQS, and therefore BST does not 
fit methodologically with this model.  Also, the ATWO PQS was excluded from the 
comparison as it is a new requirement, and not common to the previous versions of 
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SWOS.  Furthermore, the SWO Intro validation table (Appendix A) indicates ATWO has 
not yet been incorporated into the curriculum. 
c. Initial Officer Proficiency 
Overall Watch and Admin PQS progress is an approximation of how well 
initial training prepares officers for work in these areas.  While this is a measure of 
officer preparation, it does not indicate initial proficiency.  Such a determination needs to 
incorporate a SWO’s time allocation between Watch and Admin.  Table 6 derives initial 
officer proficiencies.  The Watch and Admin PQS progress totals from Table 5 are inputs 






























Watch PQS Progress 0.421 0.231 0 0 0 0 0 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071
NF Watch Component 0.047 1 1 0.5 0.2 1 1 1 0.75 0.6 1 1
Total Watch 0.468
Admin PQS Progress 0.319 0.086 0 0 0 0 0 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065
General Managerial Skills 0.160 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
NF Admin Component 0.053 1 1 0.5 0.2 1 1 1 0.75 0.6 1 1
Total Admin 0.532
Initial Officer Proficiency 36.5%
SWOS-at-Sea SWO Intro
21.6% 28.0%
OOD UW Factor = 0.95
 
Table 6.   Initial Officer Proficiency 
Table 6 organizes all indicators of initial value (PQS progress from initial 
training, Navy Familiarization and General Managerial Skills from the commissioning 
source) into Watch and Admin categories.  The weight column shows the factor each 
value is given.  Recall that the Watch and Admin categories are weighted relative to the 
time officers are expected to devote to these types of work (46.8 and 53.2 percent, 
respectively).  Also recall that the maximum NF value is 10 percent of overall 
proficiency (4.68 for watch, and 5.32 for admin). 
 33
The Watch value category is only comprised of the NF and Watch PQS 
Progress Components.  Subtracting the NF Component yields a Watch PQS Progress 
weight of 42.1 percent.  The Admin value category is comprised of three components.  
After subtracting the NF Component, Admin PQS Progress and General Managerial 
Skills account for the rest of Admin value category.  This research weights Admin PQS 
progress twice as heavily as GMS, because much of the administrative work requires 
intimate knowledge of Navy regulations and procedures. 
SWOSDOC, SWOS-at-Sea, and SWO Intro IOP calculations are largely 
similar, with the exception of how they incorporate the NF component.  IOPs for each 
training method were calculated by summing the products of the “weight” and “initial 
training” columns.  The SWOSDOC calculation is straightforward, as professional 
development differences across commissioning sources should have disappeared after six 
months of formal SWO training.  Thus, all SWOSDOC accessions receive the same NF 
component factor of “1.”  However, commissioning source differences are assumed 
unleveled under SWOS-at-Sea and SWO Intro, which explains their subdivision into 
commissioning source columns.  To determine a community-wide proficiency for each 
training method, the appropriate NF factor must be applied to each DIVO accession 
point.  This accounts for commissioning source effects on overall officer proficiency 
under each SWO training method. 
A final adjustment needs to be made to the IOP to account for the value 
gained between the Underway OOD and SWO qualifications.  The last required SWO 
PQS is the Underway OOD qualification.  Naturally, as the IOP is heavily based on PQS 
progress, proficiency demonstrated by gains in PQS ends at the OOD qualification.  This 
research assumes that progress towards OOD Underway accounts for 95 percent of a 
DIVO’s total value, leaving 5 percent for the progress towards SWO qualification.  An 
average preparation time between OOD and SWO qualifications of four weeks is 
assumed.  Under SWOS-at-Sea and SWO Intro, three weeks of ASAT training bring the 
total to seven weeks.   
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The calculations in Table 6 indicate that officers reporting from 
SWOSDOC had the highest IOPs (36.5 percent) as a result of the six months of formal 
SWO training.  Under SWOS-at-Sea, first-tour DIVOs reported to their ships with only 
the preparation afforded by their respective commissioning sources, which yielded the 
lowest IOPs (21.6 percent).  DIVOs that graduate from SWO Intro have IOPs of 26.8 
percent.  With the IOPs established, the learning curve that brings first-tour DIVOs to full 
proficiency can be approximated. 
B. ESTABLISHING THE LEARNING CURVE 
The SWO OJT learning curve is equivalent to the time it takes an average DIVO 
to reach SWO qualification after arrival to the ship.  The lack of dependable quantitative 
data within the SWO community necessitated that a few assumptions be made.  
Although, even if the annual average time to reach SWO qualification was known, to 
make a current comparison it would have to correct for environmental factors unique to 
the time period in which it was collected.  A discussion of these factors precedes the 
SWO qualification timeline calculation. 
1. Qualification Timeline Factors 
Before explaining the learning curve calculations, it is necessary to discuss the 
factors that can affect SWO qualification times.  There exist a variety of environmental 
factors that can alter the time to reach SWO qualification.  These factors include (but are 
not limited to) OPTEMPO, shipboard manning, and shipboard qualification climate 
influenced by SWO training policy.   
As indicated in Chapter II, SWOs are groomed to be professional mariners and 
leaders at sea.  The reductions in OPTEMPO in recent history make it increasingly 
difficult for ship COs to test their DIVOs at sea, which could have the effect of either 
delaying qualification, or qualifying officers prematurely to not impede their career 
progression.  Ship manning levels also influence qualification times.  Larger officer 
wardrooms negatively impact individual officer “stick time”, which could significantly 
slow qualification.  But perhaps changes to training policies have the largest impact on 
qualification rates, as explained in the following paragraph.   
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The introduction of ASAT (the three-week leveling course that precedes SWO 
qualification under SWOS-at-Sea and SWO Intro) shortened the time CO’s had to qualify 
their officers as Underway OODs.  Prior to ASAT, the SWO qualification requirement 
was 18 months (OPNAV, 2002).  This meant that an officer could qualify as Underway 
OOD, and then as a SWO, as late as 18 months without violating SURFOR guidance.  
Once ASAT was added to the qualification process, there was no accompanying shift in 
qualification timeline, which effectively gave officers less time to qualify onboard.  Even 
after adding the five weeks of SWO Intro training in 2008, SURFOR maintained an 18 
month qualification requirement (COMNAVSURFOR, 2010).  In short, the Navy 
crammed two months of additional off-ship training into the same shipboard qualification 
timeline.  Furthermore, ships might have sent DIVOs to ASAT ahead of deployments to 
either avoid losing them during operationally demanding periods or to beat the ASAT 
deadline that would occur while deployed, suggesting the potential for premature 
qualification.  Perhaps as a direct result of this, SURFOR removed the OOD UW 
requirement prior to ASAT attendance (COMNAVSURFOR, 2010). 
The numerous factors that affect SWO qualification rates make it difficult to draw 
a meaningful comparison based on initial SWO training method.  As a result of the 
factors stated above, if previous versions of SWOS existed today it would not necessarily 
cause SWO qualification rates to revert to those of the past.  So even if qualification 
timeline data were available, it would not translate well to the current training 
environment.  This section explained how environmental factors influence the 
qualification process.  It is important to note that personal factors insert variability as 
well. 
SWO qualification is a process that differs according to the individual.  The 
“Deck” Division Officer might qualify quickly as a Small Boat Officer, while the 
“Auxiliaries” Division Officer might complete the SWO Engineering PQS first.  Even 
though the ship’s Senior Watch Officer is in charge of tracking DIVO qualifications, it 
does not provide enough structure to suggest that there is a predictable path to 
qualification.  As suggested by previous research, much of the process depends on 
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variables such as DIVO intelligence, motivation, and even their relationships with senior 
officers (Bradley, 2011; Bowman & Crawford, 2009). 
2. Reconstructing SWO Qualification Timelines  
To approximate how older versions of SWOS might be run in today’s Navy, it is 
necessary to understand how qualification was driven in the past.  Figure 2 illustrates 
SWO qualification timeline changes over the past few decades (Operations, 1987 & 
2002; Forces, 2010 & 2011). 
 
Figure 2.   Nominal SWO Qualification Requirements (in months) by Period 
During the 1980s, first-tour DIVOs were given the 24 months to qualify as SWOs over a 
36 month tour.  In the 1990s, the Navy accelerated the qualification requirement to 18 
months over a 24 month tour.  Once SWOSDOC gave way to SWOS-at-Sea, DIVOs 
were still expected to earn their qualification in 18 months with far less initial training.  
The introduction of ASAT into the training pipeline without lengthening the qualification 
requirement accelerated the qualification process even more.  The 18 month requirement 
remained constant throughout SWOSDOC, SWOS-at-Sea, and SWO Intro until 2011, 
when SURFOR increased the onboard qualification time to 22 months 
(COMNAVSURFOR, 2011).  Some might argue that the increase to 22 months was an 
admission the qualification process has been rushed in recent years.  Regardless, the 
change supports the assumption of this research that the SWO qualification requirement 
should be increased during periods of less initial training, and decreased during periods of 
more initial training.  Figure 3 displays the real shipboard qualification (OJT) period after 
factoring out initial training and ASAT. 
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Figure 3.   Real SWO Qualification Requirements (in months) By Period 
To project the SWO qualification timelines of previous versions of SWOS in 
today’s environment, it is assumed the standard qualification time onboard would be 
consistent with the training method.  Simply put, heavier initial training should yield 
quicker qualification times.   
Attainment of the Underway OOD qualification signals the completion of SWO 
PQS, which this research equates to 95 percent of the total officer value (SWO attainment 
is the final 5 percent).  Subtracting Initial Officer Proficiency from the OOD Underway 
proficiency yields the “Proficiency Gained Onboard” (Table 7).  SURFOR’s most recent 
guidance of “14 to 17 months” is a good indication of how long it should take to qualify 
Underway OOD in today’s surface fleet (COMNAVSURFOR, 2011).  An average of this 
OOD qualification range indicates that generally graduates of SWO Intro can be expected 
to qualify OOD Underway within 15.5 months of reporting onboard.  It should be noted 
that in practice, the timing of SWO Intro is anything but predictable, as indicated by 
ongoing research from Crawford and Bowman.  However, the 15.5 months is a 




















SWOSDOC 0.36 0.95 0.59 0.59 13.5 13.5 1.00 14.5
SWOS-at-Sea 0.22 0.95 0.73 0.73 17.0 17.0 1.75 18.7
SWO Intro 0.28 0.95 0.67 0.67 15.5 15.5 1.75 17.3  
Table 7.   Predicting SWO Qualification Timelines by Initial Training Method 
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To approximate “Months to OOD UW” for SWOSDOC and SWOS-at-Sea, it is 
assumed that once onboard, officers have the capacity to learn at a rate independent of 
initial training method.  Equation 1 uses the “Proficiency Gained Onboard” and average 
months to qualify OOD UW under SWO Intro to approximate the rate at which DIVOs 
learn their profession. 
SWO Proficiency Gain Rate = 67% / 15.5 months = 4.3% per month  (1) 
Again, assuming that monthly proficiency gains do not change with respect to initial 
training method, this learning rate applies for all versions of SWOS.  A rate of 4.3 
percent proficiency gain per month applied to the “Proficiency Gained Onboard” for 
SWOSDOC and SWOS-at-Sea yields 17 and 13.5 months, respectively.  Thus, suggested 
OOD UW qualification times during SWO Intro of 15.5 months were utilized to project 
current qualification times under previous versions of SWOS. 
After earning the OOD UW qualification, DIVOs must prepare for their SWO 
qualification board.  Under SWOSDOC, a standard preparation time of four weeks is 
assumed.  Under SWOS-at-Sea and SWO Intro, DIVOs are required to attend three 
weeks of ASAT upon earning OOD UW.  The time spent away from the ship brings their 
total preparation time to 7 weeks (1.75 months).  Adding this preparation time to the 
OOD UW timeline yields “Months to SWO” (Table 7). 
According to calculations, DIVOs who graduated from SWOSDOC should 
qualify faster than those who were trained under the two subsequent training methods.  
This research estimates that graduates of SWOSDOC would earn their SWO pins in 14.5 
months, while those who accessed under SWO Intro and SWOS-at-Sea attain SWO 
qualification in 17.3 and 18.7 months, respectively (Figure 4).  The length of the SWO 
OJT learning curve (shipboard qualification process) serves as the basis for the SWO 
OJT investment calculation. 
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Figure 4.   First-tour DIVO Proficiency Progression per Initial Training Method 
C. DETERMINING THE INVESTMENT 
This section explains how DIVO proficiencies are converted to values.  The 
research assumes that if officers demonstrate 50 percent proficiency, then they earn 50 
percent of their paycheck (salary plus benefits).  In other words, officer monetary value is 
derived by multiplying the monthly DIVO proficiency by the monthly cost to the Navy 
(Ensign Composite Pay Rate).  The portion of their compensation that is not earned is 
considered subsidized, a cost that decreases as SWOs progress towards their SWO 
qualification.  The OJT investment is the difference between a DIVO’s average monthly 
value (MV) and the monthly cost (MC) to the Navy, as defined in Equation 2.  The term 
Mn represents the average number of months to achieve SWO qualification for each 
initial officer training method.   
 
























-7 Leave -1 Leave -2 Leave 7,575.08$    
-6 SWOSDOC BST/Report 21.6% -1 BST
-5 SWOSDOC 1 26% Intro/ Report 28% 1801.20 5773.89
-4 SWOSDOC 2 30% 1 32% 2128.76 5446.32 2282.87 5292.22
-3 SWOSDOC 3 35% 2 37% 2456.33 5118.76 2610.43 4964.65
-2 SWOSDOC 4 39% 3 41% 2783.89 4791.19 2938.00 4637.09
-1 SWOSDOC 5 43% 4 45% 3111.45 4463.63 3265.56 4309.52
BST/Report 36% 6 48% 5 50% 3439.02 4136.07 3593.12 3981.96
1 41% 7 52% 6 54% 2928.60 4646.48 3766.58 3808.50 3920.69 3654.40
2 45% 8 56% 7 58% 3256.16 4318.92 4094.15 3480.94 4248.25 3326.83
3 49% 9 61% 8 63% 3583.73 3991.36 4421.71 3153.37 4575.82 2999.27
4 54% 10 65% 9 67% 3911.29 3663.79 4749.27 2825.81 4903.38 2671.70
5 58% 11 69% 10 71% 4238.85 3336.23 5076.84 2498.24 5230.94 2344.14
6 62% 12 74% 11 76% 4566.42 3008.66 5404.40 2170.68 5558.51 2016.57
7 67% 13 78% 12 80% 4893.98 2681.10 5731.97 1843.12 5886.07 1689.01
8 71% 14 82% 13 84% 5221.55 2353.54 6059.53 1515.55 6213.64 1361.45
9 75% 15 86% 14 89% 5549.11 2025.97 6387.09 1187.99 6541.20 1033.88
10 80% 16 91% 15 93% 5876.68 1698.41 6714.66 860.42 6868.77 706.32
11 84% OOD Qual 17 95% 15.25 94% 6204.24 1370.84 7037.39 537.70
12 88% ASAT 17.25 96% OOD Qual 15.5 95% 6531.80 1043.28
13 93% ASAT 17.5 96% ASAT 15.75 96% 6859.37 715.72
13.25 94% ASAT 17.75 97% ASAT 16.0 96% 7168.55 406.54
OOD Qual 13.5 95% 18 98% ASAT 16.25 97% 7304.54 270.54
13.75 96% 18.25 99% 16.5 98%
14 98% 18.5 99% 16.75 99% 7204.43 370.66
14.25 99% SWO Qual 18.75 100% 17 99% 5620.44 60.87 7412.76 162.32
SWO Qual 14.5 100% SWO Qual 17.25 100% 3740.20 47.34 1887.01 6.76
Total OJT 
Investment 
per officer 35,272.30$ 53,943.59$   45,564.63$  
Table 8.   OJT Investment per Officer by Initial Officer Training Method 
The left side of Table 8 shows the estimated proficiency gains of a first-tour 
DIVO.  “Report” indicates their start of OJT and corresponding IOP.  The months are 
tallied on the left side of each column to show the time spent in initial training and OJT.  
After “OOD Qual” the timeline shifts from months to weeks to show a DIVO’s weekly 
progress between OOD UW and SWO qualifications.  The average investment is 
calculated monthly, and then again for the remainder of weeks until SWO qualification.  
The total OJT investment per first-tour DIVO is calculated by adding the average 
monthly investments until SWO qualification. 
According to the calculations, as a result of completing the 100– and 200– level 
PQS during initial training, graduates of SWOSDOC require the lowest OJT investment 
of the three initial training methods ($35,272 per officer).  Graduates of SWOS-at-Sea are 
required to learn their entire jobs onboard ship, which is reflected in their particularly 
high OJT investment of $53,944 per officer.  Naturally, as SWO Intro provides a 
moderate level of training, the current OJT investment ($45,565 per officer) is less than 
that associated with SWOS-at-Sea, but is still more expensive than that of SWOSDOC. 
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D. INCORPORATING PREVIOUS INITIAL TRAINING COST ESTIMATES 
After the determination of the SWO OJT investment, a natural question at this 
point would be, “So what did SWOSDOC, SWOS-at-Sea, and SWO Intro cost the 
Navy?”  It does little good to discuss the shipboard costs associated with previous 
versions of SWOS without an understanding of what they cost to implement.  Lieutenant 
Christopher Gavino’s 2002 thesis, Cost Effectiveness Analysis of the “Sea to SWOS” 
Training Initiative on the Surface Warfare Officer Qualification Process, provides the 
framework for this answer.  A brief exploration of Gavino’s cost estimates provides 
initial training costs per officer for SWOSDOC and SWOS-at-Sea, and assists in 
determining SWO Intro costs as well. 
Gavino’s thesis estimated the costs incurred from officer commissioning through 
SWO qualification (whereas this thesis was limited in scope to the shipboard 
component).  For simplicity, all post-commissioning costs are referred to as “formal 
training” costs.  His shipboard cost estimate for SWOS-at-Sea CBT, based on time 
devoted to CBT completion, needs to be adjusted to reflect the reality that DIVOs 
devoted very little time to CBT (Crawford, 2010).  A proficiency-based cost estimation 
corrects for this. 
Unlike this thesis, Gavino’s work focused on costs associated with initial training 
such as Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves, temporary duty en route (TDY) 
travel, and Billet Special Training (BST).  With a few adjustments, his cost estimates can 
be used to determine what each method should cost the Navy today.  Furthermore, even 
though his estimate preceded the establishment of SWO Intro, many of his cost figures 
still pertain to the current version of SWOS.   
Adjustments to Gavino’s cost estimates (detailed in Appendix B) yield initial 
training costs per officer of $65,605 for SWOSDOC, $37,211 for SWOS-at-Sea and 
$43,283 for SWO Intro.  Adding these costs to the OJT investment shows the Navy’s 
total post-commissioning investment for SWO qualification (Table 9).  
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SWOSDOC Costs SWOS-at-Sea Costs SWO Intro Costs
Formal Training 65,604.84$                37,210.84$                      43,282.51$                   
OJT 35,272.30$                53,943.59$                      45,564.63$                   
Total 100,877.14$           91,154.44$                    88,847.14$                  
Table 9.   Training Costs Per Officer from Commissioning to SWO Qualification 
E. RESULTS 
By combining the OJT investment with Gavino’s initial training cost estimate, 
one can see the tradeoff between formal and on-the-job training costs.  As the Navy 
increases its investment in formal training, it effectively relieves the ship from training 
officers on the basic knowledge required of them.  As the Navy decreases investment in 
formal training, the ship’s burden of training first-tour DIVOs increases.  A current 
comparison of the three versions of SWOS over the past few years demonstrates that 
SWOSDOC is the most expensive in terms of formal training costs, but produces officers 
with the highest initial proficiencies.  Conversely, the SWOS-at-Sea program is the least 
costly formal training to implement, but produces officers with the lowest initial 
proficiencies.  SWO Intro performs in the middle in terms of initial training cost and 
initial officer proficiency, but costs the least from commissioning to SWO qualification, 
as illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Total SWO Investment by Initial Training Method 
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Figures 6–8 display formal and on-the-job training costs as a percentage of the 
overall SWO investment for each version of SWOS.   
 
 
Figure 6.   FY 11 SWOSDOC Investment Allocation 




Figure 7.   FY 11 SWOS-at-Sea Investment Allocation 
During SWOS-at-Sea, the Navy nearly eliminated formal SWO training (except for BST 




Figure 8.   FY 11 SWO Intro Investment Allocation 
Under SWOS-at-Sea, the Navy achieved relative balance between formal and on-the-job 
training, at 49 and 51 percent of the total investment, respectively. 
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IV. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, EPILOGUE, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The persistent changes to initial SWO training over the past decade hinted at the 
need for analysis of their impact on officer quality.  This research developed a 
proficiency-based cost estimate of the Navy’s investment in first-tour OJT, and applied it 
to the past three versions of formal SWO training.  This estimate called for an analysis of 
SWO qualification requirements, and to what extent incoming DIVOs were prepared to 
meet them.  Commissioning source preparation, formal SWO training, and SWO PQS 
progress were considered the three contributors to officer proficiency.  The value of a 
first-tour DIVO was calculated by multiplying officer proficiency (represented as a 
percentage of full proficiency) by the Navy Ensign Composite Pay Rate.  The first-tour 
OJT investment was calculated by summing the monthly differences between officer 
values and officer costs over the shipboard qualification period. 
An accurate estimation of shipboard OJT costs required an analysis of SWO 
qualification timelines.  Consideration was given to using past qualification timelines to 
approximate OJT costs of older SWOS versions, but the results would have made for a 
poor comparison as environmental factors significantly altered the qualification process 
and timeline over the years.  Instead, the OJT costs for each version of SWOS were 
calculated in terms of today’s shipboard qualification experience (where varying 
OPTEMPO, manning levels, and training policies could not influence the results).  
Furthermore, if future training decisions were to be based on this comparison, 
policymakers would have to consider current, not past, operational factors. 
Finally, once the shipboard OJT investment was calculated, it was combined with 
initial training cost estimates from Gavino to provide the Navy’s total investment in 
SWO training from commissioning to SWO qualification. 
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B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. SWO Training Investment 
The model calculated the OJT investment under SWOSDOC to be the least 
expensive at $35,272 per officer.  Shipboard OJT during SWOS-at-Sea was determined 
the most expensive at $53,944 per officer.  SWO Intro OJT costs per officer were 
$45,565.  Gavino calculated initial training costs for SWOSDOC and SWOS-at-Sea at 
$65,605 and $37,211 per officer, respectively.  Elements of his cost estimate were 
applicable to SWO Intro as well, the cost of which this thesis estimated at $43,283 per 
officer.  This yields a total SWO investment of $100,877 for SWOSDOC, $91,154 for 
SWOS-at-Sea, and $88,847 for SWO Intro. 
Comparing SWOS-at-Sea and SWO Intro costs indicates that modest increases to 
investment in initial training resulted in greater reductions to shipboard OJT costs.  
However, SWOSDOC’s relatively high total investment cost suggests there is a point at 
which tradeoffs between initial and shipboard training become inefficient. 
The research concludes that reductions to formal SWO training did not result in 
direct savings, as the budgetary cost savings were offset by increases to the proficiency-
based shipboard training costs.  In other words, much of the budgetary costs were 
effectively transferred to ships in terms of undertrained first-tour officers, as explained in 
the next section. 
2. Hidden Costs of OJT 
While it is common to view costs in terms of tangible budget line items, there are 
other important costs to be considered, which can be difficult to perceive.  This thesis 
concludes that while the elimination of SWOSDOC reduced the budgetary cost of SWO 
training, it passed many of these costs onto the ship in the form of lower officer 
proficiencies.  It is difficult to measure the true cost of low officer proficiencies however, 
as they may cause second- and third-order effects that are not felt for some time. 
When officers arrive at their ship without the proper training, the ship bears the 
burden of either training them, or doing their work until they are capable of doing it 
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themselves.  During SWOS-at-Sea, the officer wardroom bore increased responsibility of 
DIVO development and mentoring, which added to its shipboard responsibilities.  
Department Heads and SWO qualified officers needed to devote more time to training 
inexperienced officers on how to perform their duties.  The time DIVOs were dedicating 
to CBT was time they were not managing their divisions.  If DIVOs were not around to 
manage, or did not know how to manage, the Chief bore increased responsibility for 
division management.  By filling in for inexperienced division officers on matters like 
divisional administration, Chiefs were essentially doing two jobs.  In this way, untrained 
DIVOs negatively impact shipboard readiness. 
As originally designed, formal SWO training was meant to prepare officers for all 
aspects of duty at sea, which included watchstanding.  While difficult to measure, 
reductions in formal SWO training have the potential to negatively impact watchstanding.  
Less initial training implies a reduction in officer quality, which could translate to an 
increase in operational mishaps.  As the $78 million price tag of the 2009 USS Port Royal 
grounding suggests, watchstanding mishaps are costly (Kakesako, 2011).  On a per capita 
basis in terms of 789 annual SWO accessions in 2011 that cost would amount to $98,859. 
Poor officer retention is another hidden cost that may increase as initial training 
decreases.  In 1970, when the SWO retention rate was 14 percent,  the SWO Retention 
Study Group recommended “better schooling” to Admiral Zumwalt as a means to 
improve the professionalism of the surface navy, which lead to the establishment of 
SWOSDOC in 1975.  (Muir, 1996)  Increasingly, officers criticize the surface navy for 
making their first DIVO tour “trial by fire” under the SWOS-at-Sea initiative, and 
suggest more initial training to increase professional satisfaction (Shovlin, 2008).  
Conceivably, the cost savings achieved by ending SWOSDOC might come back in 
greater magnitudes as officer recruiting expenses, or increased retention bonuses. 
As explained above, periods of limited initial officer training can increase 
shipboard training costs to a much larger extent than what this thesis indicates.  When the 
Navy bases wide-reaching training policy on budgetary savings (as the 2010 GAO report 
suggests) it is potentially missing the larger picture. 
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C. EPILOGUE   
1. Latest Proposal for SWO Training 
In June of 2011, SWOSCOLCOM CO Captain Neil Parrott outlined the latest 
proposed changes to initial SWO training (named the Training Project Plan, or TPP) in a 
speech at the Surface Navy Association West Coast Symposium in San Diego.  He stated, 
“We’re making a pitch to the SWO Flags for bringing SWOSDOC back!” 
(SWOSCOLCOM, 2011)  Prior to the speech, CAPT Parrott secured support for the TPP 
at the Surface Warfare Officer Flag Officer Training Symposium (SWOFOTS).   Since, 
SURFOR has approved the plan, which now awaits final approval and funding from 
NETC.  As proposed, prior to arrival at the fleet, ensigns would report to SWOS satellite 
commands in either San Diego or Norfolk for two months of formal training called Basic 
Division Officer Course (BDOC).  Training responsibility would shift back to SWOS, 
allowing ATGs to return to the business of training ships.  The proposal (illustrated in 
Appendix C) calls for lengthening the first DIVO tour from 27 to 30 months.  After their 
first tour, DIVOs would report to four weeks of Advanced Division Officer Course 
(ADOC) to receive training in navigation, advanced shiphandling, and maintenance via 
the proposed Junior Officer Ship Material Readiness Course.  Following ADOC, DIVOs 
would complete BST for their next assignment of 18 months. 
2. Implications for SWO OJT Investment 
This plan could reduce the shipboard OJT costs for a few reasons.  First, the 
second month of formal SWO training would double current SWO training, suggesting 
an increase to initial officer proficiencies as long as learning objectives continue to 
follow SWO PQS.  Concerning formal SWO training for DIVOs, Parrott simply stated, 
“More is better.”  Second, SWOSDOC would be conducted in the two largest FCAs 
where access to fleet assets could provide valuable hands on training that relates to 
classroom instruction.  BDOC would place the ensigns in a shipboard environment 
without the added pressure of shipboard duties.  This could greatly enhance training, 
increase shipboard familiarization and initial officer proficiencies.  Third, SWOS is 
removing the ASAT requirement (renamed ADOC) until the end of the first tour, which 
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eliminates the logistical challenge of sending officers off the ship for nearly a month 
during the qualification process.  Without knowing BDOC learning outcomes, it is 
difficult to quantify proficiency-based OJT cost reductions.  However, it is certain that 
there will be reductions, the benefits of which must be weighed against the associated 
increase in initial training costs. 
3. Preliminary Cost Estimate 
Based on a very preliminary cost estimate, the change would represent a 
minimum annual cost increase over SWO Intro of $2,880 per officer.  This figure 
considers MPN for the ten instructors (O3) and Officer in Charge (O4), the additional 
four weeks of MPN for each student (O1), and the removal of ASAT from the 
qualification period.  Yet, the benefits might outweigh the added budgetary costs.  BDOC 
would disincorporate ATG personnel from instruction, enabling them to refocus on their 
primary responsibilities of shipboard training.  From the outset, it might bolster the SWO 
community’s commitment to professionalism, which could positively impact recruiting 
and retention.  Provided its curriculum design incorporates more Fundamental and 
Systems-level PQS, it would produce officers with an increased understanding of critical 
SWO knowledge, relative to the past two versions of SWOS.  Two months might even be 
the appropriate course length to introduce DIVOs to what lies ahead without negatively 
impacting knowledge retention.  While imprecise, the benefits of increasing training 
could lower mishap rates and the cost of officer retention. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the results of this research, it is possible for the Navy to further reduce 
the shipboard OJT investment.   
1.  Ensure SWO PQS remain the basis for initial training curriculum design.  To 
the extent possible, it is recommended SWOSCOLCOM use Fundamental and Systems-
level PQS as the basis for future curriculum design efforts.  As PQS is the Navy’s 
measuring stick for SWO proficiency and qualification, it must be the basis for 
curriculum design.   
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2.  NETC should fully approve and fund the Training Project Plan.  Approval of 
the proposed BDOC and ADOC training changes would be a step in the right direction 
towards reducing some of the training burden on the ships and ATGs.  This research 
shows that periods of increased initial training reduce OJT costs by more fully preparing 
officers for the work of a SWO.  BDOC would double the length of current training at 
SWO Intro, and ensure that all SWO accessions (not just USNA and NROTC) are trained 
on the waterfront with exposure to fleet assets.   
3.  Naval Personnel Command (NAVPERS-41) and SWOSCOLCOM should 
cooperate to maintain high screening standards for instructor billets.  Some instructors 
would jokingly refer to SWOSDOC as “CIVLANT” as they anticipated leaving the Navy 
after their tour in Newport, and would commonly breeze through teaching lessons in half 
the time required (Robinson, 2008).  When initial training was reintroduced after SWOS-
at-Sea, instruction responsibility was handed to officer and enlisted ATG personnel as a 
collateral duty, a direction change from their intended focus on shipboard training.  
Officers have voiced disapproval of ATG’s involvement in the process (Crawford, 2010).  
This is not to demean the quality or motivation of ATG instructors.  Rather, negative 
comments were offered in the context of a desire for more direct SWO involvement.  
Naturally, due to limited manpower, ships rely on all qualified SWOs to participate in 
mentoring and training.  But that does not mean initial training commands should also 
view a SWO pin as a teaching qualification.  To teach young and impressionable officers 
at initial training should be a privilege rewarded to the highest performing, career-minded 
officers.  CAPT Parrott spoke of the BDOC instructor selection process, “By the way, we 
won’t take just anybody” (SWOSCOLCOM, 2011).  It is recommended that 
SWOSCOLCOM and NAVPERS-41 coordinate to ensure first-tour DIVOs continue to 
be taught and welcomed to the SWO community by its best and brightest.  
E. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Conduct further research to determine the appropriate SWO qualification 
timelines.  When attempting to find the average qualification time associated with each 
version of SWOS, one discovers that it depends on too many other changing factors to 
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isolate the effect initial training plays.  In the early 1980s officers were given 24 months 
to attain SWO qualification after six months of formal training.  The requirement over the 
past decade has been 18 months (until recently changed in 2011).  After the elimination 
of initial training under SWOS-at-Sea, there was no accompanying increase in the SWO 
qualification requirement.  In fact, after the introduction of ASAT and SWO Intro (nearly 
two months of additional training) the qualification requirement remained 18 months 
until 2011.  So was the SWO community forcing too much training into an 18 month 
period, or were qualification times artificially long in the past?  Would SWO 
qualification times increase if ASAT was removed from the qualification process? 
Determine the appropriate length for initial SWO training.  How long should 
initial training be?  LCDR Robinson wrote of a common saying in Newport that 
SWOSDOC was “Two months of school crammed into six months” (Robinson, 2008, p. 
60).  Is it coincidence that the proposed length of BDOC is two months?  At what length 
does learning retention degrade?  Does learning retention improve when classroom 
discussion is supplemented with ship visits and hands-on training? 
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APPENDIX B: METHOD FOR CALCULATING INITIAL 
TRAINING COSTS, ADAPTED FROM GAVINO 
The following is an excerpt from Gavino’s thesis that summarizes his cost 
estimation for SWOSDOC and SWOS-at-Sea: 
      
ADJUSTMENTS TO GAVINO’S SWOSDOC COST ESTIMATE: 
1. Eliminate “POST-SWOS”, the shipboard training cost component. 
2. To arrive at FY 2011 costs, multiply FY 2003 costs by a factor of 1.2834 in 





ADJUSTMENTS TO GAVINO’S SWOS-AT-SEA COST ESTIMATE: 
 
1. Eliminate the following shipboard training cost components: “PRE- and POST-
OOD TRAINING”, and “CBT”. 
2. His cost estimate for ASAT (T-SWOS) was based on a five week curriculum, but 
the program was shortened to three weeks.  Multiply his estimate by a factor of 
0.6. 
3. Substitute actual budget numbers where practical (specifically for ASAT). 
4. To arrive at FY 2011 costs, multiply FY 2003 costs by a factor of 1.2834 in 
accordance with the Naval Center for Cost Analysis’ Joint Inflation Calculator. 
 
SWO INTRO COST ESTIMATE: 
1. Utilized Gavino’s cost estimates for Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves, 
Billet Specialty Training (BST), and temporary duty en route (TDY) at ASAT. 
2. The rest comes from Operations and Maintenance (OMN) and Military Personnel 
(MPN) costs associated with SWO Intro, the Division Officer Leadership Course 
(DIVOLC), and ASAT. 
a. SWO Intro cost estimates provided by ATG Pacific, San Diego, were used 
as a proxy for SWO Intro courses run throughout the fleet.  OMN costs of 
$220 per officer account for a variety of learning materials and books 
provided the students upon arrival.  MPN costs per officer converted the 
Navy Ensign Annual Composite Rate of $90,901 into a monthly cost of 
$7,575 (consistent with the four-week SWO Intro curriculum).  There 
were no instructor costs as SWO Intro instruction at the ATG is 
considered a collateral duty. 
b. DIVOLC is a one week course taught at Centers for Personal and 
Professional Development (CPPD) across the fleet.  Again, San Diego 
Naval Station’s CPPD was used as a proxy for the other FCAs.  As costs 
were not available, they needed to be approximated.  DIVOLC OMN costs 
of $55 were approximated by multiplying SWO Intro OMN costs ($220) 
by a factor of 0.25, as DIVOLC is a quarter the duration of SWO Intro.  
One week’s worth of pay per officer ($7,575* 0.25) yielded an MPN of 
$1,894.  The two DIVOLC instructors (pay grades O3 and O5) cost 
$144,700 and $187,883, an annual total of $332,583.  This divided by last 
year’s student throughput of 454 yields $732 per officer. 
Note: Further detail on BST costs are not within the scope of this thesis.  For simplicity, 




INITIAL TRAINING COSTS BY TRAINING METHOD 
 
SWOSDOC Costs FY 2003 FY 2011
PCS 1 and 2 7758 9957
SWOSDOC OMN/MPN 31720 40709
BST 11640 14939
Total 65,604.84$     




ASAT TDY 2831.4 3634
ASAT OMN 3574
ASAT MPN 5681
Total 37,210.84$     
SWO Intro Costs FY 2003 FY 2011
PCS 3879 4978
BST 11640 14939
SWO Intro OMN 220




ASAT TDY 2831 3634
ASAT OMN 3574
ASAT MPN 5681
Total 43,282.51$      
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